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I. 
ARGUMENT 
GMW IMPROPERLY CONFLATES ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
IMMUNITY WITH UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
GMW conflates Eleventh Amendment immunity with state sovereign immunity 
under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah ("Immunity Act"). By way of 
background, in Utah, there are two types of sovereign immunity: 1) sovereign immunity 
under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution; and 2) common law 
sovereign immunity that pre-dates the constitution, which is statutorily-codified under 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. Compare Wagoner Cnty. Rural Water Dist. No. 2 
v. Grand River Dam Auth., 577 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 2009) (analyzing sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment); with Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 
2005 UT 30, 19, 116 P.3d 295 (analyzing sovereign immunity under the Immunity Act). 
GMW' s apparent confusion between "Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity" 
and sovereign immunity as defined by the State in state statute may be somewhat 
understandable given the contradictory language used in the relevant cases. As outlined 
in A WSF' s opening brief, courts have often analyzed the question of whether a state has 
the authority to deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction as a question of 
"Eleventh Amendment immunity." See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-99, 118, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (I 984) (noting that 
"Eleventh Amendment immunity" is the "explicit limitation on [Article III] federal 
jurisdiction.") But the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that while the phrase "Eleventh 
Amendment immunity" "is convenient shorthand" for the States' "immunity from suit," it 
4 
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is "something of a misnomer, [because] the sovereign immunity of the States neither 
derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment." Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706, 713, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 {1999). Indeed, "the States' 
immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed 
before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today." Id. See also id. 
at 736 (noting that the "[b]are text of the [Eleventh] Amendment is not an exhaustive 
description of the States' constitutional immunity from suit."); Fed. Maritime Comm 'n v. 
S. Carolina Ports Auth. .. 535 U.S. 743, 753, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d. 962 {2002) 
("[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope of the States' sovereign 
immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that imm~ity.")1 It is this 
"fundamental aspect of the sovereignty of the State" that endows the State of Utah to 
determine "not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued." See, e.g., 
Alden, 527 U.S. at 713; Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 97-99. 
To be clear, neither A WSF nor USURF have asserted sovereign immunity under 
the Eleventh Amendment in this case to date. Instead, AWSF and USURF have sought 
to dismiss GMW' s non-contract based claims because GMW failed to file a notice of 
claim and an undertaking under Utah's state statutory Governmental Immunity Act. (R. 
243; 339.) Those underlying motions gave rise to the district court's certified questions 
1 For an overview of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on·sovereign immunity and a 
discussion regarding the distinctions between a State's Sovereign Immunity and Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, see Actions in Which a State is a Defendant-State Sovereign 
Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 13 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3524 (3d 
ed.). 
5 
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that are the subject of this appeal. (See R. 542-552, Attached as Addendum A to 
A WSF's Opening Br.) 
The first certified question poses a classic question of state statutory interpretation. 
Specifically, the first question requires the Court to evaluate the meaning of "public 
corporation" and "instrumentality of the state" as those terms are used in the 
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. (R. 543.) 
The second certified question poses a similar question of state statutory 
interpretation, asking this Court to determine whether the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act's venue and jurisdiction provisions in Utah code sections 63G-7-501 and -502 "vest 
exclusive original jurisdiction" in Utah state district courts. (R. 543.) In other words, 
this question asks whether the state legislature has made the affirmative decision to limit 
its waiver of immunity to its own state district courts. The short answer to this question 
is: yes. But GMW focuses instead on whether the State of Utah has the authority to 
deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear claims brought under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. (See R. 543.) Established U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence disproves GMW' s argument. 
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has established that individual States-as 
sovereign entities-do in fact have authority to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to 
hear claims brought against the State in federal court in the limited cases involving a 
state's sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 
U.S. 89, 97-99, 118, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (explaining that while Article 
III traditionally provides federal courts with jurisdictional authority, a State's sovereign 
6 
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immunity is an "explicit limitation on [Article III] federal jurisdiction;" and concluding 
that this limitation on Article III authority allows a state to determine not only "whether it • 
may be sued, but where it may be sued.") 
Finally, the third certified question asks whether the Office of the Attorney 
General or any litigant has the authority to waive the jurisdictional and venue provisions 
of the Act. (R. 543.) While the parties provide different analysis on this question, each 
party answers this question in the affirmative. 
II. AWSF IS A PUBLIC CORPORATION AND/OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF 
THE STATE UNDER THE APPLICABLE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
A. GMW'S Proposed Six-Factor Test is Inapplicable 
GMW ignores the plain language of Utah's Immunity Act and instead proposes a 
"six-factor test," which is based on federal case law analyzing the distinct Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity framework. (GMW Br. at 20-33.) This approach 
incorrectly applies an Eleventh Amendment "arm-of-the-state" test to this simple issue of 
statutory construction under Utah's Immunity Act. Specifically, the first certified 
question asks this Court to interpret the phrases "public corporation" and "instrumentality 
of the state" as those terms are used in the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. (R. 
543.) This Court's longstanding cannons of statutory construction provide the applicable 
framework for analyzing these statutory terms. Yet GMW would have this Court to 
disregard its established cannons of statutory construction and instead adopt an entirely 
new test, made up of various "factors" that other courts have used in analyzing whether a 
certain entity is considered an "arm of the state" under Eleventh Amendment Immunity. 
7 
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GMW's proposed six-factor test should be rejected outright. First, GMW's 
proposed factors improperly conflate the "arm-of-the-state" doctrine under Eleventh 
Amendment immunity with the State of Utah's governmental immunity as articulated 
under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. Indeed, GMW's proposed test would 
turn this Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence on its head. Utah courts have long 
held that a state entity may be entitled immunity Utah's Immunity Act even where that 
same entity is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity. See, e.g., 
Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 992, 995, 997 (10th Cir. 1993) (enbanc) 
(holding that school districts are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity even 
though "Utah courts have consistently held that school districts are entitled to" immunity 
under Utah's Immunity Act.). 
Second, none of GMW's cited cases address Utah's Governmental Immunity Act, 
which is squarely at issue here. See, e.g., (GMW Br. 22-23 (citing Woods v. Rondout 
Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 466 F.3d 232,240 (2d. Cir. 2006) (applying six-
factor test to determine whether an entity was an "ann of the state" for purposes of the 
Eleventh Amendment); United States ex rel. Fields v. Bl-State Dev. Agency of Missouri-
Illinois Metro. Dist., No. 16-3783, 2017 WL 3254401, at *2 (8th Cir. Aug 1, 2017) 
(same).) Even the cases cited in GMW's multi-page footnote 3 are not persuasive, given 
that each of those cases merely use various iterations of the Eleventh Amendment 
immunity's "arm of the state" test to analyze either Eleventh Amendment immunity or 
various state sovereign immunity statutes. (See GMW Br. P. 20-22, fn. 3.) In fact, none 
of the state cases cited by GMW even analyzes how other states define "public 
8 
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corporation" or "instrumentality of the state," as those terms are defined by the various 
states. (See id.) As such, the Court should reject GMW's proposed six-factor test. 
B. The Court Should Use Applicable Cannons of Statutory Construction 
to Hold That A WSF is a Public Corporation and/or an Instrumentality 
of the State Under the Act 
Instead, the Court should rely on its longstanding cannons of statutory 
construction, which require the Court to first look to the plain language of the statute, and 
then to consider dictionary definitions to determine the ordinary meaning of those terms. 
See, e.g., Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship~ 2011 UT 50,, 14,267 P.3d 863 
(plain language); State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44,, 13,308 P.3d 517 (noting that Utah 
courts look to dictionary definitions as a "starting point" in "determining the ordinary 
meaning of nontechnical terms of a statute"). As previously briefed, the Act's plain 
language, other similar provisions of the Utah Code, dictionary definitions, and Utah case 
law all dictate that A WSF is properly considered a "public corporation" and/or an 
"instrumentality of the state" under Utah's Act. (See AWSF Br. 2-7; see also USURF Br. 
8-17.) 
Specifically, A WSF is a public corporation since: I) it is government owned, in 
that it is wholly owned, operated, and controlled by USU, which is "the State" under the 
Act; 2) it was created pursuant to the legislature's permission under Utah statute; and 3) it 
was created for the public purpose of administration of government, including research 
and education. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-7-102(10); id. § 53B-18-501(1). (See 
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Similarly, A WSF is also an "instrumentality of the state" under the Act because 
A WSF acts as the "means ... through which a function of [USU as the state] is 
accomplished." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, "instrumentality" {10th ed. 2014). 
Specifically, A WSF was created by USU pursuant to statutory and regulatory authority to 
meet USU' s public function of providing higher education and technical education, 
including scientific, research and educational objectives. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-
102(10); id. § 53B-1-101; id.§ 53B-18-501(1). (See also R. 353.) 
C. Even Applying GMW's Misguided Six-Factor Test, These Factors Weigh in 
A WSF's Favor 
Yet even if the Court were persuaded by GMW to abandon its longstanding 
cannons of statutory construction and adopt GMW's proposed six-factor test-which it 
should not do-the majority of these factors weigh in AWSF's favor. First, AWSF was 
created pursuant to state statute, with legislative and executive oversight. Utah Code § 
53B-18-501(1). Specifically, the Utah legislature specifically enabled "Utah State 
University [to] form nonprofit corporations or foundations controlled by the president of 
the university and the State Board of Regents to aid and assist the university in attaining 
its charitable, scientific, literary, research, and educational objectives." Utah Code § 
53B-18-501(1). Moreover, the executive body, the Board of Regents, has authority to 
oversee and approve contracts entered into by nonprofit corporations created by USU. 
Id. at §53B-7-103(4). Second, AWSF was financially dependent on USU, which is the 
"state" under the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-102(10). (See R. 353-354; R. 360-
363.) Indeed, AWSF was established and funded by a seed grant from USU. Third, 
10 
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A WSF was created by the government, since it was created by USU, which is ''the state" 
under the Act. Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-7-102{10). (See R. 353-354; R. 360-363.) 
Fourth, A WSF was created for the integral state function of education and research. Utah 
Code§ 53B-18-501(1). Specifically, AWSF was "created for public purposes connected 
with the administration of government" for research and education. (R. 353.) Thus, 
A WSF would still be considered a governmental entity under GMW' s flawed test. 
Nonetheless, the Court should reject GMW's six-factor test and hold that AWSF is a 
public corporation and/or instrumentality of the state using long-established cannons of 
statutory construction. 
ID. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE ACT PROHIBITS PLAINTIFFS FROM 
BRINGING IMMUNITY ACT CLAIMS IN FEDERAL COURT 
The second certified question asks whether Utah's Government Immunity Act 
"reflect[s] an intent by the State of Utah to limit the Immunity Act's waiver of sovereign 
immunity to suits brought in Utah district courts." (R. 543.) GMW urges that the answer 
to this question is "no." GMW argues that the jurisdictional provisions in the Immunity 
Act do not preclude suit in federal court because state sovereign immunity merely 
embodies "the principal that the state cannot be sued in its own courts without consent." 4Ji:) 
(GMW Br. 36, citing Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 628, 629 (Utah 1983)2.) GMW's 
position is contradicted by U.S. Supreme Court case law on this question. 
2 Notably, Madsen was decided before Pennhurst or Atascadero, which both held that 
"[a] State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may 
be sued, but where it may be sued." Additionally, Madsen cited Hans v. Louisiana, 134 
U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890) for the proposition that "the state cannot be 
sued in its own courts without consent." 658 P.2d 628, 629 (Utah 1983). But Hans 
11 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that "[a] State's constitutional interest in 
immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued." 
Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman. 465 U.S. 89, 99~ 104 S.Ct. 900~ 79 
L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (emphasis in original); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 
473 U.S. 234,241, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985); Welch v. Texas Dept. of 
Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473-474 (1987); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson 
Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304-308. 
For instance, in Pennhurst, the Court held that a federal court did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claims against state officials because the State of 
Pennsylvania had sovereign authority-as outlined in the Eleventh Amendment3-to 
establish "not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued." 465 U.S. at 99. 
The Court held that "[t]his Court's decisions thus establish that 'an unconsenting State is 
immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of 
another state" and that "[t]his jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of relief 
sought." Id at 100 (emphasis added). There, the court ultimately held that the federal 
court did not have authority to rule on the plaintiffs claims against Pennsylvania state 
officials with regard to either their state claims or on the basis of pendent jurisdiction. 
actually held that, as in Pennhurst and Atascadero, a federal court could not hear a suit 
brought by a citizen against his own State. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 98 (analyzing 
Hans); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 (same). 
3 As previously explained, the U.S. Supreme Court has since noted that the phrase 
"Eleventh Amendment immunity" is often used as "convenient shorthand" for the States' 
"immunity from suit," but it is "something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of 
the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment." 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). 
12 
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Id. at 120-121 (holding that "neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of 
jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment"). 
In keeping with this line of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Tenth Circuit has 
analyzed these cases, along with the plain language of Utah's Governmental Immunity 
Act, and concluded that Utah's Act "goes beyond mere consent to be sued in its own 
courts in that it expressly declares that its own courts are the exclusive tribunals for suits 
against it. This is a positive expression of policy against suits against Utah in United 
States Courts." Richins v. Indus. Constr .• Jnc., 502 F.2d 1051, 1055 (10th Cir. 1974) 
( emphasis added); see also Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F .3d 
1226, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999); Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1554 (10th Cir. 1995). 
Indeed, numerous Utah federal courts have cited this proposition in holding that federal 
courts do not have jurisdiction to hear claims brought under the Immunity Act, absent 
"unequivocal consent" from the State. See, e.g., Shultz v. Dixie State Univ., No. 2: 16-
CV-830-TS, 2017 WL 1968651 (D. Utah, May 11, 2017) (citing Atascadero State Hosp. 
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985)); Zimmerman v. 
Univ. of Utah, No. 2:13-CV-01131-JNP-DBP, 2016 WL 6839371 (D. Utah, Nov. 21, 
2016). In sum, there is a long line of U.S. Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit, and federal case 
law rejecting GMW's argument that the State of Utah does not have the authority to 
prevent cases against the State from being brought in federal court. ~ 
Finally, GMW also makes the unpersuasive argument that the Act does not apply 
to this case because GMW has not "articulated a reliance upon the waivers expressed in 
the Immunity Act." (GMW Br. 38-39.) This argument misunderstands the application of 
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the Act. Under the Act, "each governmental entity and each employee of a governmental 
entity are immune from suit for any injury that results from the exercise of a 
governmental function." Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-7-201(1); see also id.§ 63G-7-101(2) 
("The scope of the waivers and retentions of immunity found in this comprehensive 
chapter: (a) applies to all functions of government, no matter how labeled; and (b) 
governs all claims against governmental entities or against their employees or agents 
arising out of the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, 
or under color of authority."); id. at -101 (3) (" A governmental entity and an employee of 
a governmental entity retain immunity from suit unless that immunity has been expressly 
waived in this chapter."). 
The Act also sets out strict procedural requirements, which apply to "[ ajny person 
having a claim against a governmental entity" or its employee, "regardless of whether or 
not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental." See id. _§ 
63G-7-401; § 63G-7-402; § 63G-7-601 (2). ( emphasis added). 4 Thus, whether or not the 
Immunity Act applies here depends on the definition of "governmental entity" as that 
term is defined under the Act. See id. 63G-7-102. It is irrelevant whether GMW has 
invoked or otherwise "articulated a reliance upon the waivers expressed in the Immunity 
Act," as GMW asserts. Indeed, GMW' s reading of the statute would require an absurd 
4 As previously noted, an entity may be subject to the Act's procedural Notice of Claim 
requirements, but still not qualify for sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment or even under the Immunity Act. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Washington City, 2010 
UT App 297,, 17,243 P.3d 500 (citing Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ,I 
27, 24 P.3d 958) (noting that the Act's Notice of Claim requirement applied to an entity, 
even though that entity was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Immunity Act) 
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result whereby any plaintiff could avoid the implications of the Immunity Act by simply 
crafting their pleading in a way to avoid "articulating a reliance" upon the Act. The 
Court can and should reject GMW' s interpretation of the Act to "avoid[] absurd results." 
See, e.g., Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48127, 387 P.3d 1000. 
IV. ASTATEENTITYMAYWAIVETHEIMMUNITY ACT'S 
JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS BY INVOKING THE JURISDICTION 
OF THE FEDERAL COURT 
Finally, GMW agrees with AWSF that a Utah entity may waive the Act's 
jurisdictional and venue provisions by invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court. 
(GMW Br. 39-42.) While the briefs rely on different authority to come to this 
conclusion, each party nonetheless reaches the same conclusion. Accordingly, the Court 
can and should hold that a State may waive the Act's jurisdictional provisions, which is 
consistent with the wealth of U.S. Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit, and Utah federal district 
court jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The Court should resolve the three certified questions as follows. 
First, A WSF is entitled to the protections of the Immunity Act as a public 
corporation and/or an instrumentality of the state. This conclusion is supported by the 
plain language of the statute, related statutory provisions, dictionary definitions, and case 
law. The Court should reject GMW's proposed six-factor test, which improperly 
conflates Eleventh Amendment arm-of-the state analysis with this question interpreting 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. 
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Second, sections 63G-7-501 and-502 of the Immunity Act reflect an intent by the 
State of Utah to limit the Immunity Act's waiver of sovereign immunity to suits brought 
in Utah district courts, rather than federal courts. This is consistent with U.S. Supreme 
Court jurisprudence and federal courts that have analyzed these questions. 
Third, while federal district courts generally do not have authority to hear a 
plaintiffs claims subject to the Act, this case presents an exception because A WSF has 
invoked the jurisdiction of the federal court by filing counterclaims in federal court. 
State entities do have the authority to waive these provisions. 
DATED this 30th day of October, 2017. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C. 
Arthur B. Burger 
Beth J. Ranschau 
KUNZLER LAW, P.C. 
/s/ 
Ryan B. Bell 
Attorneys for Appellees Utah State University 
Advanced Weather Systems Foundation & Scott 
Jensen 
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